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~EQUlRED JOINDER OF CLAIMS
William Wirt Blume*

T

HERE are three principal reasons for requiring the joinder of
claims: {I) To prevent the evils of a multiplicity of suits. ( 2) To
eliminate the possibility of more than one recovery on one liability.
(3) To make possible the ranking of claims and a pro rata distribution
of property. In this paper the writer will undertake a brief survey of
the common situations in which joinder of claims is or may be required, with the object of indicating the extent to which the practice
is bottomed on the principle of preventing unnecessary suits. For the
purposes of the survey the claims will be grouped as follows:
I. Claims of one claimant against one claimee
2. Claims of several claimants against one claimee
Action by claimants
Action by claimee
3. Claims against property
4. Counterclaims.

-I
Claims of one claimant against one claimee
a. Splitting a cause of action
Under the common law a plaintiff is permitted to join in one action
as many claims as he has against the defendant provided all can be
recovered in one form of action. The claims joined need not be relat~d,
hence may involve different questions of law and require different
evidence for their proof.1 Joinder in•equity is discretionary, being permitted when convenient for all concerned.2 Under the codes wholly
I.

* Professor

of Law, University of Michigan,-Ed.
whatsoever could be comprised in the Writ, however multifarious, might
be comprised in one Declaration; but whatever could not be contained in one Writ,
could not be comprehended in the Declaration, because the Declaration was to be
conformable to the Writ." GILBERT, HISTORY AND PRACTICE OF THE CoURT OF CoMMON PLEAS, 3d ed., 4 (1779). CLARK, CoDE PLEADING, 2d ed., 436 (1947).
z Newland v. Rogers, 3 Barb. Ch. (N.Y.) 432 (1848). CLARK, CoDE PLEADING,
2d ed., 437 (1947).
1
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unrelated claims can be joined if they fall within one of the classes set
forth in the codes.8 If they do not come within one class they must be
related to the extent that they must "arise out of the same transaction
or transactions connected with the subject of the action." 4 Under the
federal Rules of Civil Procedure there is free joinder of claims without
regard to common questions or common evidence.5 It thus appears that
there is a well-established procedure known as permissive joinder· of
claims. There is, however, no corresponding practice known as required
joinder of claims. The rules of required joinder have been developed
under other names. A conspicuous example is found in that part of the
law of res judicata called. splitting a cause of action. 6
Whenever a judgment is rendered for .or against the plaintiff on
"part" of an "entire" claim, the judgment precludes the plaintiff from
maintaining another action on another "part" of the same "entire"
claim.7 The nature of an "entire" claim can be indicated best by a
series of illustrations:
(I) P's property consisting of multiple parts or items is taken by D
on one occasion. P has but one "entire" claim for the value of the property.
( 2) The same property is taken by D on different occasiqns. P has
as many claims as there were occasions.
(3) P's person and property are injured by Don one occasion. In
most jurisdictions P has but one "entire" claim for damages.
(4) D repeatedly slanders Pon one occasion. P has but one "entire" claim for damages.
(5) D employs X to injure Pin all possible ways. On one occasion
X injures P's person. On another occasion X injures P's property. P
may maintain two actions against D.
· ( 6) D trespasses on P's land on successive days. P has but one "entire" claim for all injuries caused prior to commencement of suit.
{ 7) Multiple items of property are sold by P to D under one contract. P has but one "entire" claim for the price or value of the property
sold.
( 8) D agrees to pay P a sum of money in monthly installments:
3

CLARK, CoDE PLEADING, 2d ed., 442 (1947).
Id. 452. Blume, "A Rational Theory for Joinder of Causes of Action and Defenses and for the Use of Counterclaims," 26 M1cH. L. REv. l at 20-21 (1927).
5
Rule 18.
6
The rule is treated as a part of the law of judgments. See JunGMENTS RESTATEMENT 242-257 (1942). Permissive joinder is classified as procedure; required
joinder, as substantive law. Id. 245-6.
7
Id. 242.
4
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P has but one "entire" claim for all installments past due when action
is commenced.
( 9) P from time to time sells goods to D on account. P has but one
"entire" claim for the total price or value of goods sold.
Where multiple items of property have been taken on one tort
occasion, it is obvious that the commencement of a separate action for ·
each item would lead to an intolerable multiplicity of suits. To prevent
the evils of multiplicity we say there is but one invasion of one primary
right--one cause of action. Since P has only one cause of action he can
maintain only one action for all the items of property. Pendency of
an action for one item may be pleaded in abatement of a later action
for. another item. A judgment for the value of one item prevents
a second judgment for another item. 8 On the other hand, it should
be noted that a claim for the value of one item is, in itself, a complete cause of action. 9 P 'has a right to each item of his property.
An invasion of his right to all the property is also an invasion of
his right to each item. If we say he has a cause of action for the
value of each item, we must require joinder of these causes of action in order to prevent a multiplicity ·of suits.
Assuming that the same property was taken on different tort occasions, we get a different result. P's rights are the same. The invasions
are the same. Here, however, we have two or more causes of action
which may be maintained separately.10 This difference in result can be
supported only on grounds of procedural convenience. Where similar
rights have been invaded on different occasions there is some saving
of time and expense if the claims are joined in one action, but it has
been thought that the saving is not enough to justify requiring that
they be joined. Where such rights have been invaded on one occasion
8

Two cases of Farrington and Smith v. Payne, are reported in 15 Johnson

(N.Y.) 431 and 432 (1818). In the first action the plaintiff recovered a judgment
for the value of three bed quilts. "On the trial, [ of the second action] the same
evidence was produced, by, the plaintiff below, as in the last case, with this addition,
that when the defendants below took the three bedquilts there mentioned, they also
took the bed." Held: Judgment for value of the bed reversed. "The seizure of the
bed, and the bedquilts which then lay on the bed, was one single indivisible act; and
the plaintiff ought not to be permitted to vex the defendants, by splittitng up his claim
for damages into separate suits for each article seized.••• Suppose a trespass, or a conversion of a thousand barrels of flour, would it not be outrageous to allow a separate
action for each barrel?"
9
See first case in note 8, supra.
10
"The rule does not prevent, nor is there any principle which precludes, the
prosecution of several actions upon several causes of action ..•• all demands, of whatever nature, arising out of separate and distinct transactions, may be sued upon separately." Strong, J., in Secor v. Sturgis, 16 N.Y. 548 at 554 (1858).
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the increased saving of time anq. expense justifies a requirement that
they be joined.
'
In the case of injury to person and property on one tort occasion,
procedural convenience dictates that the damages resulting from the
tort or torts be recovered in one action. While the desirability of joinder
has been clear, the courts have found it. difficult to require joinder
through the common-law device of considering claims arising on one
occasion as constituting an "entire" cause of action. It has been traditional to differentiate between personal rights and property rights.
think of rights of the two categories as constituting one· right calls for
a new pattern of thought-one difficult to form. It is easier to think in
terms of a rule requiring that claims arising on one tort occasion be
joined in one action.11
'.
Where one right is invaded more than once on one tort occasion
each invasion gives rise to' a cause of action. To prevent the evils of
multiplicity we consider all invasions of a right which occur on one
occasion as one invasion.12 Or we require the joinder of all claims which
ari~e on one tort occasion.
·
Where the defendant hires or directs a third person to injure the
plaintiff_ in all possible ways, and he does so on two or more occasions,
separate actions will require proof of a common fact, viz., that the
defendant hired or directed the third person to injure the plaintiff.
However, since proof of the injuries to the plaintiff will require 1 different evidence, j oinder is not required.18
Invasions of a right which occur in rapid succession are treated the
same as invasions which occur on one occasion.14
In the field of contracts the test of an "entire" claim is not whether
rights were in~aded on one occasion, or series of occasions, but whether
the rights arose out of one contract transaction or series of transactions.
Where multiple items of property are sold under one contract, the
seller has a right to be paid for each and all items of th~ property.
Failure to pay for all items is also failure to pay for each item. To
prevent the evils of multiplicity, we say failure to pay is one invasion
of one right giving rise to one cause of action.15 Had the same property

To

11 Sec. 5-606 of Idaho Laws Ann. (1943) provides "that where injuries to person
and to personal property arise out of the occurrence or transaction, causes of action may
be united in the same complaint, and separate actions for such injuries are hereby
prohibited."
12 JunGMENTS REST,\TEMENT 244, illustration 3 (1942).
18
Id. 248, illustration 9.
14
Id. 248.
15 Smith v. Jones, 15 Johnson (N:Y.) 228 (1818).
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been sold in separate parcels under different contracts, we would say
the seller has as many causes of action as there were contracts.16 Here
the saving of time and expense which would result from requiring that
the claims be made in one action is considered not sufficient to justify
a requirement that they be joined.
In the case of the installment contract the payee has a right to
each installment as it comes due. He may, therefore, maintain as many
actions as there are unpaid installments provided he sues on each installment before the next falls due. Failure to pay one installment is a
breach of the payee's right to have the contract performed according
to its terms. Breaches resulting from failure to pay two or more installments are considered one breach in order to prevent a multiplicity of
suits.11
•
•
Failure to pay all past-due items of an account may be considered
a breach of an- obligation to pay for all, or as breaches of obligations
to pay for each. The latter view was taken by Burrill in his well-known
work on New York practice:
"It is a further rule' orr this subject [joinder of causes of action], that where a party has several demands or existing causes
of action gi;owing out of the same contract, or resting in matter
of account which may be joined, and sued for in the same action,
they must be joined; and if the demands or causes of action be
split up, and a suit brought for part only, and subsequently a
second suit for the residue, the first action may be pleaded in
abatement or in bar of the second action." 18
Some early cases indicate that the rule against splitting was once
thought of as a rule requiring the joinder of claims.19
16

Secor v. Sturgis, 16 N.Y. 548 {1858).
Kruce v. Lakeside Biscuit Co., 198 Mich. 736, 165 N.W. 609 (1917). See
note in 13 L.R.A. (n.s.) 529 (1908).
18
1 A TREATISE oN THE PRACTICE oF THE SuPREME CouRT eF NEW YoRK, 2d
ed., 73 {1846).
19
,Purefoy v. Purefoy, (Eng. Ch. 1681) I Vernon 29, 23 Eng Rep 283: "In this
case the heir at law by his bill prayed an account against a trustee for two several
estates that were conveyed unto him upon trust for payment of several and distinct
debts; and now would have had his bill dismissed, as to one of the estates, and have
had the account taken for the other only. But it was decreed, that an entire account
should be taken of both estates • • • ; for that it is allowed as a good cause of demurrer
in this court, that a bill is brought for part of a matter only, which is proper for one
entire account, because the plaintiff shall not split causes and make a multiplicity of
suits." In Girling v. Aldas {or Alders), (Eng. K.B. 1670) 2 Keble 617, 84 Eng. Rep.
388, "Coleman opposed a prohibition to the honor of ale on splitting of actions, because the party was insolvent, and the contracts really several on several deliveries of
ale, by maltster to alewife, sed non allocatur, but per Curiam a prohibition must be
awarded, if the causes may be joined in one action they must, and a prohibition was
17
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There are at least three exceptions to the rule against splittingthree situations in which separate actions may be maintained on "parts"
of an "entire" cause of action: 20
(I) Where the plaintiff seeks a remedy which is applicable only
to a "part" of his "entire" claim.
_
( 2) Where the defendant conceals from the plaintiff the existence
of "part" of his "entire" claim.
_(3) Where the defendant fails to object to splitting or otherwise
consents.
The rule against splitting can be stated as a rule of procedure as
follows: The plaintiff in his complaint shall join all claims he may
have against the defendant arising upon the same tort occasion or series
of occasions or from the same contract transaction or series of transactions, except, etc. Three exceptions to the rule agains_t splitting are
noticed above. Where actions on some claims are commenced before
other claims accrue, the rule does not apply.
The provision that claims must arise upon one tort occasion or out
of one contract transaction before joinder is required, indicates an intention to require joinder only where separate actions would involve
common questions of law or fact. Where it seems likely that the same
evidence must be produced more than once to prove the same issues,
joinder in one action is clearly indicated. However, if this had been
the only purpose of the rule, it could have been accomplished by the
principle of collateral estoppel. Under this principle a decision of an
issue of law or fact in an action on one claim is conclusive in another
action between the same parties on another claim. 21 Instead of serving
as collateral estoppel, a judgment on "part" of an "entire" claim operates as a merger or bar of the "entire" claim. By going this far, the
courts force the plaintiff to join all his claims ( "parts" of an "entire"
claim) in one action. This joinder would save time (impaneling separate juries, etc.) and expenses ( service of separate summonses, etc.)
awarded." See report of same case in 1 Ventris 73, 86 Eng. Rep. 51: "Wherefore
the Court here granted a prohibition; because tho' they be several contracts, yet forasmuch as the plaintiff might have joined them all in one action, he ought so to have
done, and sued here, and not put the defendant· to an unnecessary vexation, no more
than he can split an entire debt into divers, to give the Inferior Court jurisdiction in
fraudem legis." It seems probable that the desire of the King's courts to increase and
• protect their jurisdiction gave rise to the rule against splitting. Protection of the defendant against "unnecessary vexation" was an additional reason for the rule. The
jurisdictional features of the rule are still important. Kruce v. Lakeside Biscuit Co., 198
Mich. 736, 165 N.W. 609 (1917).
20
JUDGMENTS RESTATEMENT 243 (1942). See annotations in 2 A.L.R. 534
(1919); 142 A.L.R. 905 (1943).
21
See Scott, "Collateral Estoppel by Judgment," 56 HARV. L. REv. l (1942).
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even if common questions were not involved. But since common questions are almost certain to be involved in separate actions, the rule
serves to prevent all the evils of a multiplicity of suits.
b. Consolidation
Under the common law a court may order the consolidation of
actions pending before it when they are between the same parties and
involve claims which could have been joined in one action.22 Under
some statutes and court rules actions may be consolidated although not
between the same parties 23 and not pending in the same court.24 When
a court orders the consolidation of actions involving separate claims,
the effect is to require joinder of the claims in one action.
The common-law practice of consolidating actions is not limited
to situations in which th~ separate actions involve common questions
of law or fact. 25 The presence of a common question is, no doubt, highly persuasive. But even without this reason for requiring joinder, courts
order consolidation in order to save the time which otherwise would
be spent in impaneling separate juries, and to prevent an unnecessary
duplication of court costs. Under the federal Rules of Civil Procedure
the actions must involve "a common question of law or fact.'' 26
True consolidation, as distinguished from consolidation for trial,'
is described by Gould:
''Where one brings several suits upon several distinct demands
which might all have been joined in one action, the court may
upon the defendant's motion compel a consolidation of them,that is to say, may order all the declarations in the several actions
to be inserted as so many counts in one declaration, it being unreasonable that the defendant should be harrassed with several
suits where one would answer all the purposes of justice." 21

In equity, consolidation is ordered to ~revent a multiplicity o{
suits.28
22
GouLD, PLEADING IN CIVIL AcTioNs, reprinted from 2d ed. by Hamilton,
210 (1899).
28
Cecil v. Missouri Public Service Corp., (D.C. Mo. 1939) 28 F. Supp. 649.
24
Civil Practice Act of New York:§ 96 provides that actions may be consolidated
"whenever it can be done without prejudice to a substantial right." § 97 expressly
authorizes consolidation of actions pending in different courts.
25
Cecil v. Brigges, 2 T.R. 639, 100 Eng. Rep. 344 (1788). Also see Wolverton
v. Lacey, (D.C. Ohio 1856) Fed. Case No. 17, 932.
26
Rule 42.
27
GouLD, PLEADING IN CIVIL AcTioNs, reprinted from 2d ed. by Hamilton, 210
(1899).
28
Wilmer v. Palcide, II8 Md. 305, 84 A. 491 (1912). Also see CLARK, CoDE
PLEADING, 2d ed., 490, note 191 (1947).
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Claims of several claimants against one claimee.
a. J oinder of plaintiffs

At common law all persons having a "joint" right were required
to join iri an action to enforce that right. 20 In the case of a promise
made to ~everal persons jointly, the form of the contract controlled even
th~ugh the interest~ of the promisees were several. Since the parties
understood that the promisor was making only one promise, the intention of the parties was carried out by allowing only one action by
all the promisees. In this respect, the rule requiring j oinder was a rule
of substantive law. At the same time the rule saved time and expense
by preventing separate actions involving common questions of law and
fact. Where a contract was not involved, as in the case of injury to
property held by several persons jointly or as tenants in common, the
rule was procedural in character, serving to prevent the evils incident
to a multiplicity of suits. The same rule was enforced in equity; 80 1s
expressly stated in the codes; 81 and appears in the present federal
rules.82
Where property owned by several persons, jointly or as tenants
in common, is injured, the injury can be viewed as one invasion of one
right belonging to all the co-owners, or as invasions of their individual
rights. If the first view is taken, we say the co-owners have but one
"entire" claim which should not be split. If the other view is taken,
we say each co-owner has a cause of action, but should not be allowed
to sue alone. If one co-owner does sue alone, he may maintain. the
action if the defendant fails to plead non-joinder -of the other coowners in abatement.83 A judgment in favor of one co-owner who sues
29

2d ed., 348 (Hj47)°.
Id. 353.
'
.
81 Id. 358.
32
Rule 19.
33 Addison v. Overend, 6 T.R. 766, IOI Eng. Rep. 816 ·(1796), was an action
of trespass for running down and sinking a certain ship. In one count of his declaration the plaintiff alleged that he w~ the sole owner of the ship. In another count he
alleged that he owned one-fourth of the ship. The defendant moved in arrest of judgment on the ground that the other part owners of the s~ip had not been joined as
plaintiffs, pointi_ng out that the plaintiff's mode of declaring might lead to a multiplicity
of suits. The court held that the objection must be made by plea in abatement, Lord
Kenyon, C.J., saying: "Therefore we are of the opinion that it is much more convenient to the suitoI'S', that if the defendant mean to take advantage of such an objection he should plead it in abatement, and that if there be no such plea the plaintiff
may recover, though it should appear that others ought to have been joined with
1
him." Id. at 770.
80

CLARK, CooE PLEADING,
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for himself alone, will not bar a later action by the other co-owners.3'
Although each co-owner has a cause of action arising from the invasion
of his individual· right, procedural convenience dictates that these
causes be joined in one action. · •
In the case of a promise to several persons jointly, breach of the
promise can be viewed as one invasion of one right belonging to all
the promisees, or as invasions of their individual rights. 85 If we take the
first view we have one "entire" claim which should not be split. If we
take the second view we have multiple claims which should be joined.
The rule requiring joinder may be rationalized by pointing out that
a contrary rule would permit an intoler~ble multiplicity of suits.
Where partial assignments and subrogations of a claim are recognized as a matter of substantive law, each person having an interest
in the claim has a right to recover that interest. He may not, however,
maintain an action to recover his interest without making the other
jnterested parties plaintiffs or defendants.86 When made a defendant,
a person having a part interest in a claim must demand that interest
or be forever barred. If a person having a part interest in a claim sues
alone for his interest, ·and, due to the defendant's failure to object,
obtains a judgment, the judgment does not bar 'an action by the other
34
In Sedgworth v. Overend, 7 T.R. 279, 101 Eng. Rep. 974 (1797), the owner
of the other three-fourths of the ship involved in Addison v. Overend (note 33, supra)
sued for damages caused to his interest in the ship. The defendants pleaded in abatement that the plaintiff had no interest in the ship "unless jointly and undividedly with
one J. Addison." The plaintiff replied that Addison had recovered his damages in a
previous action. Counsel for the defendants argued: "It is a clear and established rule
that when an action is-brought for an injury done to an entire and indivisible chattel
all the owners of that chattel must be joined •••• And it is peculiarly necessary
that the general rule should be applied in this case; for where an injury is done to a
ship of which there are many joint owners, permitting one alone to sue for his share
of the damage will not only tend to a multiplicity of actions, but will also enable all
the partners to become witness for each other in their respective suits." Lord Kenyon,
C.J., remarked: "But to prevent multiplicity of. actions, the defendants had an opportunity of taking this objection in the former action; and if they had availed themselves of it at the proper season, they would not have been harrassed with different
actions."
85
In Martin v. Howe, 190 Cal. 187, 211 P. 4,53 (1922), one of three joint
promisees was permitted to maintain an action for 44 per cent of the amount due on a
promisory note. The other promisees, who had been made defendants, were given
judgments for their respective interests. It appeared that the amount due on the note
had been divided by the· promisees among themselves without the consent of the
promisor. Also see Baker v. Jewell, 6 Mass. 460 (1810); Beach v. Hotchkiss, 2 Conn.
697 (1818).
86 Porter v. Lane Construction Corp., 212 App. Div. 528, 209 N.Y.S. 54 (1925);
affirmed, 244 N.Y. 523, 155 N.E. 881 (1926). Martin v. Howe, 190 Cal. 187, 211
P. 453 (1922).
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persons interested in the claim.37 Where under the substantive law
one claim may be split into two or more claims each in favor of a
different person, procedural convenience requires that the multiple
claims be made in one action.

•

b. Representative' suits
Where the number of persons having a "joint" right is so large
that it is impracticable to name all of them as plaintiffs in an action to
enforce the right, one or more may sue for the benefit of aU. This
rule, developed in equity, has been extended to actions which formerly
were actions at law.88 When employed in the situation indicated, the
rule is merely auxiliary to the rule requiring the joinder of plaintiffs.
A representative suit is sometimes expressly required in a situation in which joinder of plaintiffs is not expressly required. For instance, an action by a creditor to enforce the statutory liability of a
stockholder in a national bank which has gone into voluntary liquidation, must be brought in behalf of all the creditors.89 While each creditor has a separate claim against the bank, the fruits of an action against
a stockholder must be distribut~d ratably to all creditors who come in
and prove their claims.40 The effect of requiring a representative suit in
this situation is to require the creditors to make their claims in one
action. 41
In.some situations a representative suit is permitted, but not required.42 In these cases it is necessary to turn to the law of res judicata
to see whether the commencement of such an action has the effect of
requiring the persons represented to intervene. If the persons represented will be bound by any judgment rendered in the representative
suit, they are, in effect, forced to come in to protect their interests. A
permissive representative suit is allowed only when numerous persons
have claims which affect specific property, or there is a common question of law or fact affecting their several rights, and a common relief is
sought.48 This being true, it is apparent that the procedure is designed
87
Porter v. Lane Construction Corp., 212 App. Div. 528, 209 N.Y.S. 54 (1925);
affirmed, 244 N.Y. 523, 155 N.E. 881 (1926). Also see Underwood v. Dooley, 197
N.C. 100, 147 S.E. 686 (1929); 64 A.L.R. 656 at 663 (1930).
88
Hodges v. Nalty, 104 Wis. 464, 80 N.W. 726 (1899).
89
12 u.s.c. (1940) § 65.
40
Richmond v. Irons, 121 U.S. 27, 7 S.Ct. 788 (1887).
41 See Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. Central Republic Trust Co., (D.C. Ill.
1935) II F. Supp. 976; 2 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 2238, (1938); Women's
Catholic Order v. Ennis, (C.C.A. 5th, 1940) 116 F. (2d) 270.
42 Blume, "The 'Common Questions' Principle in the Code Provision for Representative Suits," 30 MrcH. L. REV. 878 (1932).
48 See Rule 23, federal Rules of_ Civil Procedure (1938); Blume, ibid.
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to permit a pro rata distribution of property or to prevent separate
actions for one relief where separate actions would involve common
questions of law or fact. While there is much dispute as to the effect of
a judgment in this type of action,44 it is only by holding that the persons represented are bound by the judgment, that the purposes of the
pro.cedure can be carried out. A permissive representative suit in effect
is, or should be, a device for requiring the joinder of claims.
c. Bills of peace
In the two preceding sections the discussion was limited to actions
commenced by or for several persons having claims against one claimee.
We turn now to actions commenced by the claimee against the several
claimants.
Where a I person is threatened with separate actions by different
claimants, and the claims, if prosecuted separ_ately, will involve common questions of law or fact, the person against whom the claims are
made may, in some situations, have the separate actions enjoined, and
thus require the claimants to make their claims in the action commenced by him. This type of action was developed in equity for the
avowed purpose of preventing a multiplicity of suits.' 5
Where the separate actions will involve common questions of law
or fact and the relief sought is equitable in nature, the courts agree
that the respondent should be able to force the claimants to make their
claims in one action.46 But where the relief sought in the separate actions is legal in nature, the courts are sharply divided, the majority hold44 See JUDGMENTS RESTATEMENT 415 ( I 942) ; "Effect of Judgment in Prior
Class Suit," 49 YALE L. J. 1125 (1940); "Federal Class Actions: A Suggested Revision of Rule 23," 46 CoL. L. REv. 81 8 ( 1946).
45 Chafee, "Bills of Peace with Multiple Parties," 45 HARV. L. REV. 1297
(1932).
46
See Chafee, id. at 1311. City of Sioux Falls v. Hossack, 69 S.D. 21, 5 N.W.
(2d) 880 (1942), was an action to restrain Hossack and others from subjecting the
plaintiff to a multiplicity of suits. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants, owners
of separate tracts of land along the Big Sioux River; had instituted separate suits to
enjoin the plaintiff from polluting the river, and to recover damages. An order dismissing the complaint was reversed. The law applied by the court may be summarized
as follows: (1) Two or more owners of separate tracts of land threatened with injury
by one nuisance may join as plaintiffs in one action to enjoin the nuisance, but are
not required to do so. ( 2) Where two or more owners of separate tracts of land
threatened with injury by one nuisance have brought separate actions for injunctions,
the defendant may, by suing to enjoin the separate actions, require the plaintiffs to make
their claims in the one proceeding. (3) Where two or more owners of separate tracts
of land injured and threatened with injury by one nuisance have brought separate
actions for injunctions and for damages, the defendant may, by suing to enjoin the separate actions, require the plaintiffs to make their claims in the one proceeding. (4) The
separate actions should not be enjoined unless it appears that the common questions
and any separate questions involved in the several actions can be fairly determined in
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ing that persons seeking legal relief should not be compelled to make
their claims in "a suit in equity." 47 While recognizing that it is desirable to consider in one action claims which involve common questions,
the courts refusing 'to enjoin the sepa~ate actions do so betause of a
desire to preserve trial by jury.

d. Suits to quiet title
A suit to quiet title may be maintained against one claimant or
-against several claimants. Since the object of the suit is to negative
certain adverse claims, any judgment on the merits binds all parties to
the action with respect to those claims.
Whether the plaintiff will be permitted to join several claimants
as defendants in one action may depend on whether the several claims
involve a common question of law or fact. 48 If a common question is
involved, joinder is usually permitted. If a common question is not
involved, joinder is not permitted by most courts. Where joinder is
permitted, the plaintiff by taking advantage of the rule, is able to force
the several claimants to make their claims in one action.
I

e,. Limitation of liability
When claims are made against the owners of a vessel growing out
of the operation of the vessel, the owners may have the claims limited
to their interests in the vessel plus pending freight. 49
Where. owners of cargo lost by shipwreck have commenced separate actions for damages in state and federal courts, the owners of the
vessel, by filing a petition in admiralty for limitation of liability, can
force the cargo owners to present their claims in one action.50 This proceeding, according to Taft, C.J., "partakes in a way of the features of
a bill.to enjoin a multiplicity of suits, a bill in the nature of an interpleader, and a creditor's bill." 51 Judge Rifkind states that "one of the
objects of the limitation statutes is to avoid a multiplicity of suits." 52
one proceeding. (5) It must· appear that the burden and inconvenience of determining
such questions in one proceeding is less than the burden and inconvenience of considering the common questions repeatedly in the separate actions. After working out a
thoroughly rational procedure for dealing with claims in equity, the court, in Hossack
v. City of Sioux Falls, 69 S.D. 358, IO N.W. (2d) 751 (1943), felt constrained by
the trend of modern authority to deny a similar procedure for claims at law.
47
•
See note 46, supra. Also see Georgia Power Co. v. Hudson, (C.C.A. 4th, 1931)
49 F. (2d) 66 and annotations in 75 A.L.R. 1444 (1931), 90 A.L.R. 554 (1934).
48
Annotation in 118 A.L.R. 1400 (1939)..
·
49
46 U.S.C. (1940) § 183. Also see Admiralty Rule 51, 28 U.S.C. (1940)
following § 723.
·
50
See RoBINSON, HANDBOOK ON ADMIRALTY LAW 880 (1939).
51
Hartford Accident Co. v. So. Pac. Co., 273 U.S. 207 at 216, 47 S.Ct. 357
(1927).
52
The Panuco, (D.C. N.Y. 1942) 47 F. Supp. 249 at 250.
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f. Interpleaaer
A person who is, or may be, liable to one or more of several claimants may, in certain situations, obtain an order requiring the claimants
to interplead in one action. 53 A prayer for interpleader may be made in
an action commenced by the person liable-the old equity practice-or,
under modern statutes, in an action commenced by one of the claimants.
Where a person is a mere stakeholder and willing to pay money
or deliver property to the rightful claimant, any contest over the money
or property is between the claimants. The stakeholder should not be
required to defend where he has no interest. If he is interested in resisting the claims, but is liable, if at all, only once, he should be protected
against multiple actions to enforce one liability. It should be noted,
however, that the principal object of interpleader is not to prevent the
evils incident to a multiplicity of suits, but to eliminate the risk, faced
by a person sued separately, of being required to satisfy one liability
more than once. 54 The procedure does, of course, tend to prevent a
multiplicity of suits.

3. Claims against property
a. Actions in rem

While it is recognized that all claims are in reality against persons,55 for procedural convenience claims in certain situations are dealt
with as though they were being made against specific property or a~nst
an estate.
A common instance of an action in rem is a suit in admiralty to enforce a maritime li~n. A sale under a judgment in this type of action
vests the purchaser with a clear title. 56 This being true, it follows that
when a vessel is seized in an action in rem all persons having claims
against the vessel or against any money received from its sale, must
make their claims in the court holding the vessel or the money. The
claims are usually consolidated and dealt with in one action.57 This pro53 See series of articles by Chafee in Yale Law Journal, 30-814 (1921); 33-685
(1924); 41-1134 (1932); 42-41 (1932); 45-963, 1161 (1936); 49-377 (1940).
54
Rule 22 of. the federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes interpleader when
the claims of the defendants "are such that the plaintiff is or may be exposed to
double or multiple liability."
55
See opinion by Holmes, C.J., in Tyler v. Judges of the Court of Registration,
175 Mass. 71, 55 N.E. 812 (1900).
56
The Trenton, (D.C. Mich. 1880) 4 F. 657.
57
The Oregon, (C.C.A. 9th, 1904) 133 F. 609 at 616. In this case there were
300 libelants and 58 intervening libelants. "The action of the court in consolidating
the numerous libels in this case was so clearly in accordance with established admiralty
practice that it should be commended as eminently just and proper for all parties
concerned."
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cedure permits claims to be ranked and paid in the proper order. It
also permits the property to be sold with a clear title. Incidentally, the
procedure may have the effect of preventing some of the evils of a multiplicity of suit~.
A suit to quiet title is brought to negative claims of named defendants. Where such an action is permitted to be brought as an action
in rem, the effect of a judgment for the plaintiff is to negative the
claims of all persons in the world. 58 This being the effect of the judgment, all persons having interests in the property must make their
claims in the plaintiff's action.

b. Claims against estates
Where the estate of a decedent or debtor is being administered for
the benefit of claimants, the claimants must, ordinarily, make their
claims in the one proceeding. But since the several claims are made
and considered separately, there is no joinder of claims in the ordinary,
sense.

4. Counterclaims
A comparatively new development is· an express rule requiring that
certain claims be made as counterclaims in the plaintiff's action. 59 For
instance, the California Code of Civil Procedure provides:

"If the defendant omits to set up a counterclaim upon a cause
arising out of the transaction set forth in the complaint as the
foundation of the plaintiff's claim, neither he nor his assignee
can afterwards maintain an action against the plaintiff therefor." 00
Simil~ provisions will be found in the codes of other states. 01 Under
the federal Rules of Civil Procedure a counterclaim must be pleaded
"if it arises out of the transaction ot occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim." 62
If the defendant's claim is also a defense to the plaintiff's claim
its use as a counterclaim is virtually required by rules of res judicata in
some jurisdictions. Where, for instance, a doctor sues for services, and,
the patient defends by proving that the doctor was guilty of negligence
in performing the services, the patient cannot, in a later action, recover
damages caused by the doctor's negligence.68 Courts which refuse to
58
JUDGMENTS RESTATEMENT 334 (1942). Tyler v. Court of Registration, 175
Mass. 71, 55 N.E. 812 (1900).
59
CLARK, ConE PLEADING, 2d ed., 645 (1947).
60
Deering, 1941, § 439.
61
See CLARK, ConE PLEADING, 2d ed., 646, note 54 (1947).
152
Rule 13 (a).
'
68
See annotation in 49 A.L.R. 55 l ( l 92 7) •
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allow the later action in effect require the defendant to counterclaim for
damages in the plaintiff's action.
By consolidation of actions a plaintiff in one action may be required
to make this claim as a counterclaim in another action.6 ~

II
In the foregoing survey the writer has suggested the extent of the
law requiring joinder of claims, and the headings under which the
more common rules are found. The survey is not exhaustive, but seems
to go far enough to demonstrate that we have long recognized that the
evils of multiplicity should be prevented either by requiring joinder in
the first instance, or by permitting one party to force others to make
their claims in one action. This development has been lim_ited to certain situations, but has gone far enough to be highly significant. Once
it is fully recognized that rules of required joinder should be developed along with rules of permissive joinder, the development will be
more rapid as well as more systematic and rational.
No attempt will be made to suggest future developments in other
than two situations: (I) Where one claimant has several claims against
one claimee. ( 2) Where several claimants have claims against one
claimee arising out of one tort occurrence.
(I) The rule against splitting a cause of action has the effect of
forcing a plaintiff who wishes to sue on one claim to join all other
claims he has against the defendant which arose out of the same transaction or occurrence. This rule does not affect claims which arise out
of different transactions or on different occasions. While joinder of the
latter claims may be permitted, such joinder is not required. In a discussion of joinder published some twenty years ago the present writer
suggested that joinder of all claims between the same parties, as well
as counterclaims, should be encouraged, if not forced, by providing
penalties for failure to join.65 The penalties were not to be automatic,
but were to be imposed only if the judge in the second action should
find that the claim sued on c9uld have been determined conveniently
in the prior proceeding. 66 In the new edition of his Handbook on Code
Pleading (just off the press) Judge Clark states that he "is ready to
believe that the direction of further procedural reform should be
towards compulsory joinder." 67 He is not inclined to shrink from an
6

~See Gibbs v. Sokol, 216 App. Div. 260, 214 N~.S. 533 (1926). Lee v.
Schmeltzer, 229 App. Div. 206, 242 N.Y.S. 34 (1930).
65
Blume, "A Rational Theory for Joinder of Causes of Action and Defenses and
for the use of Counterclaims," 26 MxcH. L. REv. l at 60 (1927).
66
Id. at 61.
67
CLARK, CooE PLEADING, 2d ed., 146 (1947).
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extension of the practice even if it should go so far as to include "all
items in dispute b~tween litigants." 68
( 2) Where sev~ral persons ( many in the case of a disaster) have
been injured on one occasion there is no rule requiring the injured
persons to join as plaintiffs in one action. If each sues separately the
question of liability must be decided afresh in each case. The same
witnesses must be called and the same evidence offered, over and
over again. (a) The traditional approach to the problem has been
the equity bill of peace. We have seen,'however, that most courts refuse to force the holders of "legal" claims into "equity" because of
the consequent loss of jury trial. 69 (b) Under another possible procedure joinder could be required by providing that any action brought
must be brought as a representative suit. If so brought, all persons
represented would be forced to intervene. The question of the defendant's liability would be a common question. This question could
be decided first, either by the court or- by a jury. A declaration of no
liability would end all the claims. A declaration of liability would afford all the claimants a common relief. 70 ~y supplemental proceedings
before the court or a jury or juries the amount due each could be determined. 71 Any defenses perculiar to any one claim could be passed on
at this time. ( c) Under a third possible procedure the defendant when
sued by one claimant could give notice to all others to come in and
assert ·their claims. The question of liability could be decided first,
either by the court or by a jury if one should be demanded. A decision for the defendant would end all the claims. If the decision should
be against the defendant, the court or jury, and other juries if needed,
could_ determine the amount due on each claim. Judges have been appalled by the thought of trying in one action all claims which might
arise from a major disaster. The writer is appalled by the thought of
any other course.
68

Id. 145. Referring to articles written by Blume and by Schopflocher, Judge
Clark states: "Significant, however, is the fact that these critics •• ~ end by suggesting
a solution going beyond anything urged by the author. It is in short the adoption of
procedural rules for compulsory joinder of claims beyond anything yet known, going to
all items -of dispute between litigants. • • • Certainly the author would not shrink
from. it; he is ready to believe that the direction of further procedural reform should
be towards compulsory joinder. But all signs indicate that this next step will be at
least as hard, and quite possibly as long delayed, as have been those to date."
69
See notes 46 and 47, supra.
70 See opinion of Buckley, L.J., in Markt & Co., Ltd. v. Knight Steamship Co.,
Ltd., (English Court of Appeal) [1910] 2 K.B. 1021.
.
· 71 I6id.

